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A VIEW OF COPYRIGHT FROM THE DIGITAL GROUND
Andres Sawicki*
Professor Cathay Smith's Beware the Slender Man: Intellectual
Property and Internet Folklore1 seems at first to fit comfortably within
the creativity-without-IP literature, which shows that creative practices
can thrive outside of the institutions built up around intellectual property
law. In areas as diverse as magic, tattoos, roller derby, pornography,
stand-up comedy, and cuisine, scholars have described how creative
activity is sustained even without the exclusivity that intellectual property
law provides. 2 Similarly, Professor Smith here documents how
individuals uninterested in copyright law's financial rewards nonetheless
engaged in the creative activity of generating Internet folklore.
But Professor Smith takes a different-and intriguing-tack to the
phenomenon. Much of the creativity-without-IP literature is industrywide in scope; that is, scholars attempt to identify consistent patterns
characterizing how typical participants in a creative field behave.3
Professor Smith instead emphasizes a single site of creative expression:
the development of the horror myth of the Slender Man.4 While we can
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Many thanks to the editors of
the Florida Law Review for inviting me to submit this response and for their exceptionally helpful
suggestions. This piece benefited significantly from commentary by Lili Levi. I am as always
grateful to my wife, Jessica, who pushed me to make this contribution when I would just as well
have kept it to myself.
1. Cathay Y. N. Smith, Beware the Slender Man: Intellectual Property and Internet
Folklore, 70 FLA. L. REV. 601 (2018).
2. See, e.g., CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 89, 142, 201 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017)

(discussing creativity in fields like tattoos, roller derby, and pornography); KAL RAUSTIALA &
CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: How IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION
165-66 (2012) (describing the impact of reuse and imitation on existing works in creative fields).
3. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No FreeLaugh (Anymore): The
Emergence of IntellectualPropertyNorms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA.
L. REv. 1787, 1790 (2008); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace

Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 (2009). Although IP scholars typically use
methodological approaches that obscure how individual works are created, this tendency is not
universal. For two recent, notable (though by no means the only) exceptions, see JESSICA SWBEY,
THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2-4
(2015) (using qualitative empirical approaches to explore the "intersection of intellectual property
law onthe one hand, and creative and innovative work onthe other"); KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG,
BRETT

M.

FRISCHMANN & MICHAEL J. MADISON,

The Knowledge Commons Framework, in

9, 13-14 (2017) (applying an institutional analysis
and development framework to the study of knowledge commons).
4. My characterization of the Slender Man as a "single site of creative expression' is
contestable. After all, a key feature of the development of his mythology is that it proceeded by
individuals acting without a central coordinator or organizational guidelines. See Smith, supra
note 1, at 609. We could accordingly understand each of those individuals as operating within
their own sites of creative expression. Still, there is something different about focusing on the set
GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS
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draw lessons from this case as an instance of the wider field of Internet
folklore, Professor Smith focuses on the granular details rather than the
broader patterns. The resulting richly-textured description of one creative
exercise reveals facets of its interaction (or not) with the legal system that
can be difficult to see when scholars focus on generalities. 5 In this brief
response, I highlight how her approach reveals things that
are otherwise
6
obscured in some current debates about copyright law.
I. MOTIVATING CREATIVITY

In many contexts, copyright's incentives are weak or irrelevant but
creative activity nonetheless takes place. 7 The irrelevance of copyright's
incentives does not, however, necessarily mean that individuals engage
in creative activity for no reason at all, and it is worth spending some time
trying to understand the varied reasons why people participate in creative
activity. 8 Professor Smith's approach is particularly well-suited to this
inquiry.
In some scenarios, non-legal mechanisms enable creators to obtain
some degree of exclusivity in their work vis-h-vis plausible competitors;
these creators look something like the creators in traditional copyright
models, which suppose that individuals need financial rewards in order
to engage in creative activity. 9 Whether exclusivity is enabled by legal or
non-legal mechanisms, however, it does not seem to loom large in
creators' motivations for participating in the development of the Slender
Man mythology.
In addition to financial rewards, individuals might care about nonfinancial rewards like social esteem. 10 This seems a more helpful model
of stories, images, videos, and so on that have collectively coalesced into the Slender Man
mythology as opposed to the practices typical of Internet folklore more generally because it is a
cohesive, if somewhat loosely so, creative project rather than a set of entirely unrelated works.
5. This is not to say that one or another approach is necessarily preferable over the other,
but simply that different aspects of a phenomenon become more or less visible as a function of
the level of generality with which the analysis proceeds.
6. Professor Smith's analysis encompasses both copyright and trademark law. Smith,
supra note 1, at 606-07. I limit my response to the copyright implications of her analysis.
7. See, e.g., RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 2, at 98-99.
8. It is also possible that creativity arises more from unintended and unexpected
interactions with cultural artifacts than from the kinds of intentional responses to stimuli described
in traditional copyright models. See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1178-83 (2007) (arguing that "[i]ndividual creators begin with
situatedness and work through culture to arrive at the unexpected").
9. See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 3, at 1794-95, 1812 (documenting social norms
that punish stand-up comedians for telling jokes that are too similar to jokes told by other standup comedians).
10. See, e.g., YOCHAi BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 43 (2006) (describing the "Joe Einstein" strategy of
"giv[ing] away informationfor free in returnfor," inter alia,"status [and] benefits to reputation").
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for thinking about the Slender Man story because, as Professor Smith
demonstrates, community praise played a crucial role in Slender Man's
development. An initial request by Gerogerigegege for "paranormal
images" elicited eventually a story by Lord Dangleberry to accompany a
previously posted image.1 1 Victor Surge then posted a pair of images with
accompanying captions that introduced a character recognizable as
Slender Man; the positive reaction to those posts (e.g., "lost it this is going
to give me nightmares") led Victor Surge to add more posts in the same
vein.12 He was praised again-"You are an amazing and terrible bastard,
sir. Well played."-and other individuals then joined in.13 Social rewards
thus seem to have played an important motivating role at the genesis of
the Slender Man mythology.
Finally, many individuals engage in creative activity for a variety of
internal reasons, including "compulsion, overflowing desire, and other
excesses," unconnected to the financial or social rewards they might earn
by engaging in creative activity. 14 This framework also seems to apply
here; Professor Smith shows that at least some individuals engaged in this
creative experience because, in their own telling, they felt compelled to
do so by some internal desire. LeechCode5, for example, states that "I've
been seriously debating sharing these, but after Victor Surge's posts I feel
I have to," 15 suggesting that a sense of obligation (of ambiguous origin)
drove his participation in the creative process.
In short, Professor Smith's approach helps highlight the multidimensional factors that actually spark creativity. That, in turn, should
help IP scholars build a more16complete understanding of the varied
impacts of IP law on creativity.
II. ORGANIZING COLLABORATIVE CREATIVITY

Professor Smith's approach also allows her to direct much-needed
attention to unsuccessful attempts at creative contributions. As she
demonstrates, the "comments, criticism, and rejections" of efforts that
"did not live up to the community's ideals" were important factors

11. Smith, supra note 1, at 610.
12. Id. at 612.
13. Id. at 612-13.
14. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 523; see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and
Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1945, 1949-51
(2006) (concluding that spiritual and inspirational sources, rather than economic incentive, are

motivations for creativity).
15. Smith, supra note 1, at 613 (emphasis in original).

16. For an argument favoring models of copyright's impact on creativity that shifts
copyright away from the central role it occupies in standard utilitarian economic models, see
Cohen, supra note 8, at 1177 (advocating for copyright scholars to adopt a view of creativity that

"incorporates multiple contributing factors and makes none primary").
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shaping the development of the Slender Man. 17 The question whether
Slender Man should have tentacles coming out of his back, and how
prominent any such tentacles should be, was the subject of continuous
negotiation among community members as options were proposed,
debated, and rejected until a rough consensus was reached; so too with
the question of what kinds of settings he should appear in (incongruously
in happy scenes or ominously in dark ones). 18
Future scholars might profitably focus more attention on unsuccessful
creative contributions. In a model in which financial rewards drive
creative work, failures are perhaps boring-those who invested resources
in unsuccessful contributions incur losses and the rest of us move on with
our lives. So long as risk-neutral rational actors are investing consistent
with the expected value of their contributions, there is not much to see in
failures; the level of investment would be appropriate in light of the
expectations and the fact of any given failure is simply the market's ex
post judgment of the quality of the contribution. 19
But in a model emphasizing collaborative creative activity that
supposes all kinds of motives for attempting creative work and that
assumes at least some of those attempts could undermine the collective
effort, it is worth asking the question how exactly social mechanisms
interact with failure."z Consider, for example, the possibility that too
much of a negative communal response at critical junctures could have
dissuaded potential contributors from trying their hand at the Slender
Man myth, thereby preventing the narrative from picking up steam. Or
the possibility that an overwhelming number of terrible suggestions could
have buried the few gems, making it infeasible for potential contributors
to sort through a trash heap of dead-ends for a viable Slender Man
mythology. Or that the community could not reach even a rough
consensus on which contributions were good and which were bad,
leading the effort to collapse through in-fighting.
This is not to say that collaborative, distributed creative endeavors of
this sort cannot succeed; to the contrary, Slender Man stands at least as a
possibility proof. Instead, it is simply to say that there are likely to be
interesting mechanisms to handle a world of creativity proceeding outside
of the market mechanisms to which we are accustomed. And Professor
Smith's approach to the development of Slender Man is likely to be
17. Smith, supra note 1, at 617.
18. Id. at 617-18.
19. I am of course setting aside the important questions of whether actors in this space are
rational and, if so, what role risk (and perceived risk) plays in their decision making. Those
questions are beyond the scope of this brief response, but the large literature on them is readily
accessible to interested readers.
20. For an analysis of some causes of failure in collaborative creative activities and potential
solutions to those causes, see Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, The Problem of Creative
Collaboration,58 WM. &MARYL. REv. 1793, 1808-09, 1813-14 (2017).
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particularly helpful in identifying and understanding those mechanisms.
III. THE CONTESTED ROLE OF COPYRIGHT CONSTRAINT IN PROMOTING
CREATIVITY

A recent debate has arisen over the possibility that copyright law
might stimulate creativity not only by rewarding creators, but also by
imposing constraints on subsequent creators.2 1 The basic intuition is that,
to the extent that copyright law prevents individuals from slavishly
imitating prior works, it pushes them to pursue novel ideas. 22 Legal
limitations on what creators can do might therefore function similarly to

any number of limitations on artistic expression, like the I-IV-V chord
progressions that define the blues or the arrival of a stranger in a frontier
town that drives the plot of a Western.

It is an open question how often copyright constraints lead creators to
more creative options than the ones they would have otherwise pursued;
although Star Wars and Super Mario Bros. stand as notable examples

supporting the possibility of generative constraints, it is unclear how
representative they are.23 Moreover, it is unclear how the frequency with

which individuals create around copyright compares to the frequency
with which people are simply deterred from participating in creative

activity altogether for fear of incurring liability. Answering these
questions is likely to be difficult because we would need some way of
observing the many points in the creative process at which individuals
make creative decisions, and those decisions are typically made far from
the prying eyes of interested academics.

Still, Professor Smith's approach offers a potential way forward: By
focusing her attention on a single site of creative activity, she is able to
trace at least a non-trivial number of decisions that are made on the way

to producing a creative work. Her description of the development of the
Slender

Man mythology

suggests

that most

of the interesting

characteristics were the result of (apparently) legally unconstrained
aesthetic choices by the community.24 Of course, we should not read too
21. See Joseph P. Fishman, CreatingAround Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1337-38

(2015) (arguing in favor of the possibility of generative copyright constraints); Dan L. Burk, The
"Creating Around" Paradox, 128 HARv. L. REV. F. 118, 122 (2015) (arguing that there is a
paradox within the generative constraints theory because the scenarios which the theory contends

might lead to "creating around" are precisely those in which follow-on creators would seek to
license existing works); Rebecca Tushnet, Free to Be You and Me? Copyright and Constraint,

128 HARV. L. REV. F. 125, 131 (2015) (doubting the relevance of copyright's constraints for most
creators).
22. Fishman, supra note 21, at 1335 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
23. Burk, supra note 21, at 122; Tushnet, supra note 21, at 131.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15 (identifying some critical creative decisions
in the development of Slender Man that were not influenced by legal constraints).
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much into this one case-perhaps the Slender Man is the outlier. But as
individual studies accumulate, we might gain some confidence in our
assessment of how the balance plays out.25
More generally, Professor Smith's analysis of the Slender Man as an
instance of Internet folklore casts doubt on a common proposition: that a
principal normative aim of copyright law ought to be the creation of new
works or of works that are more different than those that came before.
Participants in the Slender Man community derive value in part because
they are contributing to a mythology that others have previously
contributed to-the whole point is to participate in a shared, iterative
creative enterprise.26 If each participant were forced by copyright law to
create her own mythical creature, the utility derived from a shared,
iterative creative experience would be lost, and there is no a priorireason
to think that it would be outweighed by the utility gained from new
creative expressions. As a result, we may well derive less social utility
from forcing these individuals to create Photoshops or vignettes of
horrific creatures that bore no resemblance to the Slender Man than we
would if we permitted free reuse of each contribution by other
participants. While this is not the only scenario in which free reuse may
produce greater value than encouraging new works, it adds another data
point to challenge traditional understandings of appropriate normative
aims for copyright law.27
CONCLUSION

Professor Cathay Smith has identified a new specter to haunt
copyright scholars. Her assessment of the scope of copyright protection
in the Slender Man character, narratives, symbols, and larger mythology
is crisp and clear. But, appropriately for this elusive horror villain, the
story Professor Smith tells in Beware the Slender Man refuses to be
pinned down precisely-her inquiry does more to complicate than
resolve current debates about the relationship between copyright law and
creative activity. Still, whatever conclusions we ultimately draw from her
work, Professor Smith has made a significant contribution by identifying
new terrain ripe for exploration by legal scholars. We will be learning
from that exploration for years to come.
25. Cf BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, MICHAEL J. MADISON & KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG,
Governing Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1, 2 (2014) (arguing for
"aggregating case studies" to obtain "a more complete perspective on intellectual property (IP)
doctrine and its interactions with other legal and social mechanisms for governing creativity and
innovation').
26. See Smith, supra note 1, at 616-18 (describing the community sharing ethos that
produced the Slender Man mythology).
27. For a non-utilitarian consequentialist argument that copyright should do more to
encourage interactions with existing cultural artifacts, see Cohen, supra note 8, at 1181-82.

